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Abstract
When reviewing the literature concerning the development of the Eastern
German economy, a too rigid labor market and its respective institutions are
considered as the main source of the persistent high unemployment rates and
the slow economic performance.
However, when important macroeconomic variables are considered a sig-
nificant decline in investment in new technologies is observed. In addition, we
find evidences that the decline in investment might be affected by the steady
migration of young and skilled workers to West Germany. The decline in the
proportion of skilled workers induces firms not to invest in Eastern Germany
which leads to a general decline in job creating activities irrespective rigid
labor markets and generous social benefits.
In the recent paper we employ a rather standard Dynamic General Equi-
librium model in order to study the effects of a decline in the proportion of
skilled workers as well as the impacts of increasing benefit payments. Fur-
thermore, we assume equilibrium unemployment due to search and matching
frictions on the labor market. This approach enables us further to consider
job creating activities of the firms.
We show that an emigration shock of skilled- workers is capable to repro-
duce the findings for the decline in economic activity. This effect is strength-
ened by assuming generous social benefit payments.
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1 Introduction
When reviewing the literature1 concerning the German unemployment problem, par-
ticularly the high unemployment rate in the Eastern part of Germany, we generally
find that most of the literature concentrates on the impacts of rigid labor market
institutions and the generous benefit system as the cause of the high and partly
increasing unemployment rates in the “New Bundesla¨nder”(see, for example Merkl
and Snower (2006)). A second branch of literature focusses on possible skill differ-
ences between east and west German workers as the second (possible) explanation
of the observed unemployment pattern, such as, for example the turbulence models
by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2005, 2006).
A third branch of literature, such as Uhlig (2006), focuses on the migration flows
from east to west Germany as an explanation of the decline in East German labor
productivity and the slow economic recovery of this region. As we will show below
our results coincide with the conclusion of Uhlig (2006) that the economic recovery
of East Germany requires a long time, however, from a different perspective.
However, most of the literature concentrates solely on the labor market and its
respective institutions. In this paper we do not neglect the importance of the la-
bor market as well as institutional rigidities, however we primary concentrate on
macroeconomic aspects which might explain why there are no jobs created in East
Germany. In particular, we follow Phelps and Zoega (2001) and concentrate on
investment activities of firms as the primary force of job creating activities. Phelps
and Zoega (2001), who state that the observed path of unemployment and economic
performance is subject to, for instance, non-monetary shocks and developments,
mainly due to investment activities of firms. In particular, investment activities
determine the evolution of physical capital which is in a complementary relation-
ship to skilled and unskilled labor. When comparing the investment ratio (total
investment per GDP) of leading OECD countries the date show a significant decline
of this ratio for continental European countries such as France and Germany, in
contrast to rather stable or even increasing rates for the U.S. and the U.K. (see
table 1 below). Although there is a general decline in the overall investment ratio in
France and Germany, an increasing amount of investment is devoted to information
and communication technologies which can be interpreted as a general trend in the
structural change changes due to investments in new technologies. The comparison
1See, for example, Canova and Ravn (2000) Merkl and Snower (2006), Burda (2006), or Saint-
Paul (2004).
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of the result of table 1 shows that the investment in new technologies remained
rather constant in Germany, whereas it nearly tripled in the U.K., France and the
U.S. during the last 30 years.
Table 1: Total and ICT Investment
Year U.S. U.K. Germany France
Total Investment to GDP, %
1970-80 15.2 15.5 28.8 24.1
1980-90 16.2 13.9 21.0 19.5
1990-00 17.3 15.1 21.2 19.5
2004 19.8 16.3 18.4 20.2
ICT Investmenta
1980 15.2 4.8 12.2 6.8
1990 22.5 10.1 13.9 12.7
1995 26.1 15.6 13.3 13.3
2000 39.9 15.0 16.2 16.2
Sources: Colecchia and Schreyer (2001), OECD Main Economic Indicators 2005.
a
Measured as percentage of non-residential investment of the whole economy (Cf. Colecchia and Schreyer (2001)).
Beside this overall trend in structural change due to new technologies, let us turn
to focus on the developments in East and West Germany after the reunification
in 1990. As we show below (figures 5 and 4) the investment in new inventories,
such as computers and new machinery, declined sharply since the reunification in
both parts of Germany. Because of the fact that new inventories are strategic
complements with skilled workers the non-existence or migration of this group of
workers might force firms not to invest in East Germany.2. The complementary
relationship between new technologies and skilled workers is the particular subject
to the branch of literature that focuses on the so-called “skill-biased technological
change” hypothesis (e.g. Greiner, Rubart, and Semmler (2004)). However, the
relationship between investment activities, the availability of skilled workers and
the unemployment pattern of low-skilled workers is, however, not in the center
of the recent discussion of the East German unemployment problem. Therefore,
the attempt of this paper is to identify the mechanisms how structural deficiencies
at markets, such as a too low supply of skilled workers, determine the economic
performance of countries. In particular we analyze the interaction between structural
2There are two important exceptions because of High-Tech industries in Dresden and Jena
(AMD, Jenoptik)
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deficiencies and labor market institutions. Based on a augmented dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model which is based on Rubart (2007) we show that the non-
availability or the reduction of important production inputs worsen the impacts of
labor market institutions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section two we present
some stylized facts, in section three we outline the framework and the simulation
results of our theoretical model, section four concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
As can be seen from figure 1 East Germany is faced with high and constant unem-
ployment rates. Although there is a slight decline in recent times, the unemployment
rates is about twice as high than in West Germany.
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rates, 1991q1 - 2006q3
Source: Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit
Beside this rather dramatic evolution of unemployment in Eastern Germany, the
important question is whether the structure of unemployment is different in com-
parison to West Germany. Table 2 describes the evolution and the structure of
unemployment in East and West Germany. In table 2 we differentiate unemploy-
ment with respect to the branch in which the worker was employed before becoming
unemployed. We consider three sectors, manufacturing, basic and advanced ser-
vices. Furthermore, table 2 presents the structure of employment with respect to
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the earned educational degree. It becomes obvious that the unemployment rates
in the manufacturing and basic services sector are much higher in East Germany
than in West Germany. Furthermore, it is shown that the unemployment duration
is much higher in the “New Bundesla¨nder”. Only slight differences between both
parts of Germany are observed for the advanced services sector which captures, for
example, research and development activities. The results suggest further that the
higher the proportion of skilled workers the lower is the unemployment rate as well
as the duration of unemployment.
Table 2: The Structure of Unemployment in East and West Germany
Entire East West
Germany
Manufacturing
1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005
Unemployment Rate 15.0 20.3 23.9 33.7 12.1 16.4
Unemployment > 1 Year 36.4 36.4 29.8 40.6 40.6 33.9
Proportion of Workers
without Education 44.8 44.1 27.3 27.3 56.2 54.2
vocational Training 53.0 53.3 72.3 72.1 41.1 42.8
University degree 0.5 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.6 1.0
Basic Services
Unemployment Rate 13.8 16.9 22.4 26.6 11.4 14.4
Unemployment > 1 Year 42.0 42.2 39.0 49.4 43.6 38.8
Proportion of Workers
without Education 39.1 40.2 23.8 24.3 47.3 47.7
vocational Training 55.7 54.0 70.4 70.0 47.8 46.4
University degree 1.5 2.5 1.6 2.4 1.5 2.5
Advanced Services
Unemployment Rate 8.8 8.8 12.7 13.2 7.5 7.7
Unemployment > 1 Year 33.3 31.8 30.2 35.6 34.9 29.9
Proportion of Workers
without Education 12.1 14.1 7.5 10.7 14.6 15.7
vocational Training 39.9 21.1 37.6 41.8 41.2 42.3
University degree 28.2 29.0 29.1 31.7 27.7 27.8
Source: Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit
A similar result is obtained when we consider unemployment rates with respect
to different educational groups. Figure 2 shows that the unemployment rats of
workers which earned rather low educational degrees are significantly higher than
4
for employees with university degrees. Furthermore, when comparing East and
West Germany, the unemployment rates of lower educated workers are more than
twice as high than in West Germany. However, the level and the evolution of
unemployed workers who earned university degrees is nearly the same in both parts
of Germany. In particular, the data show an immediate and significant decline
in the unemployment rate of skilled workers after the reunification in 1990. This
sharp increase in the demand for skilled workers can be seen as an indicator for the
requirement of this particular type of workers for reconstructing the East German
economy.
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Figure 2: Unemployment Rates of Different Skill Groups, 1991-2000
By following the suggestions of Phelps and Zoega (2001) we consider gross in-
vestment (including public) and investments in new inventories. The ratio of gross
investment per GDP is still higher in East than for West Germany, however, the
investments in new inventories show also a steep decline and are in recent times
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below the respective investment ratio of West Germany. This might lead to the
suggestion that a lot of investment in the Eastern part of Germany are not spent
for new technologies. (figure 4)
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Figure 3: Gross Investment per GDP
Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany
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Figure 4: Investment in New Inventories (per GDP)
Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany
As shown above the five new “Bundesla¨nder” exhibit a significant decline in in-
vestment. In particular, the investment in new capital goods, such as new machinery
(new technologies) does not exceed the respective investment ratio of West Germany.
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In addition, the empirical result of figure 4 shows that the investment in new inven-
tories (or technologies) is significantly negatively correlated to the unemployment
rate.3
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Investment in New Equipment
Ch
a
n
ge
 
in
 
Un
e
m
pl
o
ym
e
n
t
Saxony-Anhalt
Saxony Brandenburg
Mecklenburg Western-Pommerania
Berlin
Thuringia
Germany
Rhineland-Palatinate
Lower-Saxony
Hamburg
Saarland
Figure 5: Unemployment and Investment in New Inventories
By employing simple OLS estimations in order to get further information about
the relationship between unemployment and investment activities in East Germany,
we find that the unemployment rate is negatively related to investment activities.
A result, which is already shown by figure 4.
3The dashed line is obtained through OLS, β = −0.607(-5.4818), R2 : 0.68, D.W. : 1.918,
t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 3: Unemployment and Investment, 1992-2002
Dep. Variable Independent Variable
Emigration I/Y
const. Var. R2 const. Var. R2
I/Y 0.193 -4.889 0.24
(5.131) (-1.7161)
Unemp. 0.1338 3.386 0.18 0.256 -0.605 0.54
(4.151) (-1.385) (10.602) (-3.2735)
t-statistics in parentheses, bold=significant at 95%
Table 3 supports the evidence that the emigration of young (and skilled) workers
leads to a decline in investment activities although we do not observe a significant re-
sult. A significantly negative estimation result is found for the relationship between
investment and unemployment (table 3, right column).
When recapitulating the obtained results, we observe that most of the East
German unemployment is determined by lower-skilled workers, who also account for
most of the long-term unemployed. In addition, these unemployed workers remain
in East Germany while the young and rather skilled workers leave this part of
Germany. Therefore, a possible explanation of the decline in investment as well
as in the increase in unemployment, particularly of lower-skilled workers, might be
the observed emigration of workers to West Germany in the first half of the 1990s. As
figure 6 shows, for any East German state we observe a sharp increase in migration
after the reunification in 1991. Afterwards, the migration rates declined but started
to increase again at the end of the 1990s. A second fact, that can be obtained
from figure 6, is that unemployment started to rise shortly after the increase in
migration. An additional fact that can be observed some countries is that migration
and unemployment are positively correlated.4 Particularly, the loss of young and
rather skilled workers might goes hand in hand with the decline in investment in
new equipment (technologies) which determines the long run performance of theses
states.
4For example, for Brandenburg and Mecklenburg Western-Pommerania the correlation coeffi-
cients are 0.21 and 0.19, respectively.
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Figure 6: Migration and Unemployment
Summing up the empirical facts about East Germany, a several structural prob-
lems seem to account for the obvious (un-)employment dilemma:
1. Structural changes due to the technological adjustment of the East German
manufacturing sector.
2. Decreasing investment in new technologies and, therefore, low job creation.
3. Migration of young and skilled workers to West Germany.
4. Mismatch problems, particularly for lower-skilled workers, because of techno-
logical and structural changes (see figure 2).
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5. Rigid labor market institutions as well as generous social benefit payments
which prevent unemployed workers to search for new job offers.
All in all, when considering the downward adjustment of investment behavior (see
figures 3, 4) which seems, from out point of view one of the most important causes
of the rather low economic and employment performance in East Germany we have
to ask for the explanation of this observation. Based on a rather standard dynamic
general equilibrium model with labor market frictions as well as the assumption of
different kinds of labor we analyze the impacts of rigid employment emigration and
labor market rigidities on main economic variables such as output and employment.
3 The Model
3.1 Market Structure
The model discussed in this paper is based on the seminal work by Kydland (1984),
Merz (1995) and on suggestions made by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) as well as
Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998). Furthermore, we follow the approach by
Rubart (2006b,a) who provides a detailed discussion of the effects of skill-biased
technology shocks on the relative employment position and relative wages in a dy-
namic general equilibrium context.
Without loss of generality we concentrate on, from our point of view, two main
sources of the East German dilemma. First, we study the impacts of an emigration
of one type of workers, i.e. skilled workers. As you will see below we find similar
results as the literature of “New Economic Geography” based on the agglomeration
hypothesis (see, for example, Uhlig (2006)). Furthermore, we study the effects of
rigid labor markets and generous benefit payments which also requires an extension
of the baseline model.
The model economy consists of two sectors, a household sector which supplies
labor and physical capital to the production sector. The labor force is differenti-
ated into two skill groups, high and low skilled workers, which are assumed to be
imperfect substitutes in production. The production sector consists of many small
firms using capital and both types of labor services in order to produce a single good
which can be either consumed or invested. The market for final goods is charac-
terized by perfect competition, whereas the labor market is characterized by search
and matching frictions. It is assumed that jobs for high and low skilled workers are
destroyed in any period at an exogenous rate ψi ∈ (0, 1) with i = s, u (s=skilled,
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u=unskilled). Furthermore, we assume a two sided search process, i.e. both un-
employed workers of each skill group and firms with vacant jobs seek for new job
matches.
The economy’s labor force is assumed to be constant and is normalized to one.
Let li,t denote the ratio of labor of the skill group the total labor force is given by
n = 1 = ls + lu. Each type of labor can either be employed or unemployed, i.e.
li = hi + ui. The employment of each skill group evolves according to
hs,t+1 = (1− ψs)hs,t +Ms,t (1)
hu,t+1 = (1− ψu)hu,t +Mu,t, (2)
where ψi ∈ (0, 1) denotes an exogenous rate of job destruction and Mi,t gives the
number of newly created jobs in period t. New job matches are created through a
“standard” matching technology,
Mi = M(si,tui,t, vi,t). (3)
As mentioned above, it is assumed that both skill groups are separated from each
other, i.e. low-skilled workers can not apply for high-skilled jobs and vice versa. The
matching technology given by eqn. 3 implies the following transition probabilities
from unemployment to employment and from an unfilled to a filled job vacancy of
type i:
pi,t =
Mi,t
si,t(1− hi,t)
(4)
qi,t =
Mi,t
vi,t
. (5)
The market tightness for each type of worker, θi, follows as
θs,t =
vs,t
(1− hs,t)
(6)
θu,t =
vu,t
(1− hu,t)
. (7)
With the definition of li,t = ui,t+hi,t the respective employment and unemployment
rates of each skill group follow as h˜i,t = hi,t/li,t and u˜i,t = ui,t/li,t, i.e.
u˜i,t = 1− h˜i,t. (8)
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The Household Sector
We assume a representative household with a large number of inhabitants which is
normalized to one. The household chooses consumption, ct, and the search inten-
sities, si,t of the respective skill group in order to maximize the present discounted
value of its life-time utility. Households receive income from lending capital to firms
at the interest rate rt and from having a fraction of both types of its members ni,t
work at the respective wage rates wi,t. The household’s maximization problem reads
as follows:
Ut = max
ct,si,t
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, hs,t, hu,t) (9)
subject to
ct + It +
∑
i
κi(si,t)(1− hi,t) =
∑
i=s,u
wi,thi,t +
∑
i=s,u
τhi (1− hi,t) + rtkt (10)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + It (11)
hs,t+1 = (1− ψs)hs,t + ps,tss,t(1− hs,t) (12)
hu,t+1 = (1− ψu)hu,t + pu,tsu,t(1− hu,t), (13)
where the expression τi(1− hi,t) denotes the benefits obtained from an unemployed
type i worker. From equations (9)-(13), the Lagrange function follows as
max
ct,si,t
LH = Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U(ct, hs,t, hu,t)
+λt
(∑
i=s,u
wi,thi,t +
∑
i=s,u
τhi (1− hi,t) + rtkt
−ct − It −
∑
i
κi(si,t)(1− hi,t)
)
(14)
+ξ1,t
(
hs,t+1 − (1− ψs)hs,t − ps,tss,t(1− hs,t)
)
+ξ2,t
(
hu,t+1 − (1− ψu)hu,t − pu,tsu,t(1− hu,t)
)]}
,
from which the following first-order conditions are derived
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Uc(·) = λt (15)
−κss,s(ss,t)λt = ξ1,tps,t (16)
−κsu,u(su,t)λt = ξ2,tpu,t (17)
λt = βEt
{
λt+1(1 + rt+1 − δ)
}
(18)
ξ1,t = βEt
{
Uhs(·)− λt+1
(
ws,t+1 − τ
h
s + κs(ss,t+1
)
+ξ1,t+1
(
(1− ψs)− ps,t+1ss,t+1
)}
(19)
ξ2,t = βEt
{
Uhu(·)− λt+1
(
wu,t+1 − τ
h
u + κu(su,t+1
)
+ξ2,t+1
(
(1− ψu)− pu,t+1su,t+1
)}
. (20)
The firm’s problem is given by
Πt = f(·)−
∑
i
wi,thi,t − rtkt −
∑
i
τ fi ψihi,t −
∑
i
aivi,t, (21)
where Πt denotes the firm’s profits, in addition
∑
i=s,u τ
f
i ψihi,t denote the sum of
firing costs the firm is faced with when eliminating a job. In accordance to the liter-
ature (e.g. Merz (1995)), the firm has to solve the following optimization problem:
max
kt,vt
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtλtΠt, (22)
subject to
hs,t+1 = (1− ψh)hs,t + qh,tvh,t (23)
hs,t+1 = (1− ψu)hu,t + qu,tvu,t. (24)
The Lagrangean function of the above problem reads as follows,
max
kt,vi,t
LF = Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λtΠt
+χ1,t
(
hs,t+1 − (1− ψs)hs,t − qs,tvs,t
)
(25)
+χ2,t
(
hu,t+1 − (1− ψu)hu,t − qu,tvu,t
)]}
.
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The respective first-order conditions follow as,
fk(·) = rt (26)
χ1,t = −
λtas
qs,t
(27)
χ2,t = −
λtau
qu,t
(28)
−χ1,t = βEt
{
λt+1(fhs,t+1(·)− ws,t+1 − τ
f
s ψs
)
−χ1,t+1(−1 + ψs)
}
(29)
−χ2,t = βEt
{
λt+1
(
fhu,t+1(·)− wu,t+1 − τ
f
uψu
)
−χ2,t+1(−1 + ψu)
}
. (30)
Furthermore, it is assumed that the total amount of the firing tax is equal to the
amount of unemployment benefits, i.e. we assume a simple budget equation for the
social security system:
∑
i=s,u
τ fψihi,t =
∑
i=s,u
τhi (1− hi,t). (31)
Wages are set according to a Nash bargaining scheme. The wage of a type i
worker follows as
wi,t = φi
[
fhi(·) +
∑
i
aiθi,t − τ
f
i ψi
]
+(1− φi)
[uhi,t(·)
λt
− κi(si,t) + τ
h
i
]
. (32)
Please note that the modified wage equation differs from the basic one in two aspects.
First, the firing costs reduce the worker’s surplus by τ fi ψi, but the benefit payments
increase the worker’s reservation wage by τhi .
3.2 Equilibrium Solution
According to Langot (1995) the symmetric general equilibrium solution is obtained
as follows: first the optimal job search and vacancy creation behavior are computed,
and the wage rate is determined within a Nash-bargaining framework. Second,
market clearing conditions in the goods and capital markets are imposed. How-
ever, because the wage is not the price which clears, for example a Walrasian labor
market, the solution to this problem is not a Pareto optimum.5 Because of the
5Cf. Langot (1995): 297.
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time-consuming matching process on the labor market, this market is characterized
by a stochastic rationing pattern, i.e. there is a positive probability 1− q(θi) that a
hiring firm does not find a worker and a probability 1− θiq(θi) that an unemployed
worker does not find a vacant job position. An equilibrium of this economy is a set
of variables
Ωt =
{
kt+1, hs,t+1, hu,t+1, ss,t, su,t, ps,t, pu,t, qs,t, qu,t,Ms,t,
Mu,t, vs,t, vu,t, us,t, uu,t, ct, yt, It, rt, ws,t, wu,t, θh,tθu,t, zt
}
which is determined by the household’s and the firm’s Euler equations as well as the
respective resource constraints.
From the first-order conditions of households’ maximization problem, given by
eqns (15)-(20), the following Euler equations are derived
βEt
{Uc(ct+1)
Uc(ct)
(1 + rt+1 − δ)
}
= 1 (33)
βEt
{
−Uhs(hs,t) + λt+1(ws,t+1 − τ
h
s + κs(ss,t+1))+
κhs,s(ss,t+1)
ps,t+1
λt+1(1− ψs − ph,t+1ss,t+1)
}
−
κhs,s(ss,t)λt
ps,t
= 0 (34)
βEt
{
−Uhu(hu,t) + λt+1(wu,t+1 − τ
h
u + κu(su,t+1))+
κhu,u(su,t+1)
pu,t+1
λt+1(1− ψu − pu,t+1su,t+1)
}
−
κhu,u(su,t)λt
pu,t
= 0. (35)
Note that λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the household’s optimization prob-
lem.
By rearranging the first-order conditions of the firm’s decision problem given by
equations (26)-(30), the following Euler equations are derived
fk(·)− rt = 0 (36)
λtas
λt+1qs,t
− βEt
{
fhs(·)− ws,t+1 − τ
f
s
+
as
qs,t+1
(1− ψs)
}
= 0 (37)
λtau
λt+1qu,t
− βEt
{
fhu(·)− wu,t+1 − τ
f
u
+
au
qu,t+1
(1− ψu)
}
= 0. (38)
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The equilibrium solution is specified by the household’s and the firm’s Euler equa-
tions (33)-(38), as well as equations (1), (2),(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12),
(13), (32),(40) (41), (42), (44), (45) and the aggregate resource constraint, which is
given by
ct + It + κs(ss,t) + κu(su,t) + asvs,t + auvu,t = yt. (39)
Furthermore the budget rule of the benefit payments (eqn. 31) has to be considered.
The household’s preferences are described by the following utility function:
U(ct, hs,t, hu,t) =
c1−Φt
1− Φ
−
h1−νss,t
1− νs
−
h1−νuu,t
1− νu
(40)
with Φ, ν1, ν2 ≥ 0, where Φ denotes the intertemporal substitution elasticity of
consumption and ν1, ν2 represent the respective elasticities for the supply of labor.
The production technology is chosen in accordance with Heckman, Lochner, and
Taber (1998) who assume both types of labor as well as labor and capital as imperfect
substitutes:
f(·) = zt
(
α
(
γ(zξst hs,t)
ρ1 + (1− γ)(zξut hu,t)
ρ1
) ρ2
ρ1 + (1− α)kρ2t
) 1
ρ2 , (41)
where zt is determined by a stationary Markov process, i.e.
zt = ω
zzt−1 + ǫ
z
t with ǫ
z
t ∼ N (0, σ
2). (42)
Furthermore, the parameters ξu, ξh > 0 denote external effects of technology on the
respective type of labor.
Migration and Benefit Shock
As already mentioned, the focus of the recent study is to analyze the impacts of
an emigration shock of skilled workers as well as an increase in benefit payments
particularly for lower skilled workers.
Therefore, we have to rewrite equations (1). For the evolution of the number of
skilled workers, assume that an emigration shock reduces the available workforce,
i.e. eqn. (1) rewrites to
hs,t+1 = (1− ψs)hs,t +Ms,t + z
em
t (43)
with
zemt = ω
em
t−1 − ǫ
em
t . (44)
An increase in benefit payments for low skilled workers is modeled in a similar way.
There we assume a positive shock
τ˜hu,t = ω
τ τ˜hu,t−1 + ǫ
τ
t . (45)
16
3.3 Numerical Results
In the following section we calibrate the model described above in order study the
following questions: what are the effects of a migration shock of skilled workers on
employment and economic activity and how do increases in unemployment benefits
strengthen such migration shocks.
The equilibrium levels of employment as well as the unemployment rates of
the different skill groups, u˜i, are chosen according to the empirical evidence as
reported by table 2, i.e. total unemployment of the respective skill group follows as:
ui = hi · u˜i. The elasticity of substitution between both types of labor services, σ1, is
chosen analogue to Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) who estimated an elasticity
of 1.4, furthermore we follow their empirical results of a elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor which is close to 1. The external effects of new technologies
are specified in line with the results of Greiner, Rubart, and Semmler (2004). The
values of the worker’s bargaining power φi are chosen in a way that both firms
and work share the surplus of a productive job equally which coincides, in general,
with the results of a centralized wage bargaining which is often found in continental
European countries. The parameters of the matching technologies as well as the
search costs are chosen in accordance to Merz (1995) and Pierrard and Sneessens
(2003), in general we assume that a skilled worker has lower search costs than an low-
skilled worker and for the firm we assume the opposite case, i.e. it is more expensive
to hire a worker with a university degree than a worker without such a degree. By
following Kluve, Schaffner, and Schmidt (2005) the quarterly job destruction rates
for skilled and unskilled workers are chosen as 1.8 and 5.6%. It should be noted
that lower destruction rates are reported for West Germany. For example, Ridder
and van den Berg (2003) report destruction rates between 1 and 2%.
Table 4: Parameter Settings
h¯s h¯u ¯˜us ¯˜uh z¯, z¯
em α β
0.25 1− N¯h 0.05 0.15 1 0.64 0.99
δ R¯ Φ γ µ νs, νu κ¯h
0.025 1/β 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.025
κ¯u ψs ψu σ1(σ2) ρ1 ρ2 ah
2× κh 0.01 0.02 0.3 (0.1) 0.7 0.7 2× au
au φh φu εh εu ω
z ǫz
0.025 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.0 0.95 0.007
ωem, ωτ ǫem ǫτ
0.1 – 0.99 0.015 0.5× au
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For the subsequent analysis the steady state of the deterministic part of the model
is computed numerically by a Newton-Raphson method provided by DYNARE6.
The impulse response functions rely on a first order approximation of the stochastic
model around its steady state.
3.4 Numerical Results
Figures 7 and 9 below show the impulse-responses of an emigration shock, i.e. a
sharp reduction in the supply of skilled workers, and an increase in unemployment
benefits.
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Figure 7: Emigration of Skilled Workers
When the supply of skilled workers declines, firms immediately increase vacancies
for skilled workers vs. Because of the given stock of employment (of both types of
workers) and of physical capital production is increased in order to finance the rising
search costs for skilled workers. However, due to the decline of the household’s
income consumption declines and the firms have no incentives to invest in new
production capital. Therefore, investment per GDP as well as the stock of capital
declines. Because of the decline in capital, and the non-availability of skilled workers
6Dynare is a pre-processor and a collection of MATLAB or SCILAB routines which solve non–
linear models with forward looking variables. See http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/.See
Juillard (1996) for details.
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the response of output becomes negative after 5 to 6 quarters. In principal, we find
a similar picture in the short boom after the German reunification between 1991
and 1993.
By varying ωem, i.e. we increase it within the interval [0.1, .99], we can study the
effects of a persistent decline in the availability of skilled workers has on important
macroeconomic variables. Particularly, we focus on the effects on the I/Y -ratio.
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Figure 8: Sensitivity Analysis, I/Y -Ratio
As expected, we observe a more persistent reduction in investment activities
when the outflow of skilled workers is more persistent (figure 8), i.e. if ωem increases.
Beside the lower investment activities, the generosity of social benefits has also a
negative impact on the employment pattern of low-skilled workers. In a next step we
consider the effects of an increase in unemployment benefits for low-skilled workers.
After an increase in benefit payments there are general incentives for both types
of workers (because of the assumed income pooling) not to search for a new job.
However, the lower magnitude of the negative response of vacancy creation for skilled
workers forces this type of workers to search for new jobs because the expected value
of a job exceeds the skilled workers outside option. On the other hand, because of
higher benefit payments, low-skilled workers reduce search activities after one year.
Because of the high negative response of vacancy creation of low skilled workers
the employment pattern of this type of workers shows the immediate and persistent
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decline.
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Figure 9: Increase in Benefits for Low-Skilled Workers
When we study the correlation of the simulated time series, we obtain the fol-
lowing results (see table 5, below).7
Table 5: Correlations
y c I/Y vs vu qs qu θs θu
y — 0.77 0.70 0.21 0.40 -0.09 0.08 -0.18 -0.29
I/Y — 0.19 0.32 -0.10 0.06 -0.15 -0.14
East Germany, 1995q1-2006q3
y — n.a. 0.26 -0.43 -0.28 0.37 -0.17
I/Y — -0.06 0.08 0.38 0.08
The above examination of the correlation between important variables shows that
the model’s explanation of observed facts is rather mixed. First, the model reports
reasonable results for the correlation between output and consumption as well as
between output and the investment ratio. Furthermore, the reported correlation
between output and the market tightness is also in reasonable ranges. However, the
7Note that for East Germany no data for vacancies with respect to different skill groups are
available. Therefore, table 5 reports for East Germany the correlation between output and total
vacancies as well as output and total market tightness, only. The calculation of the correlation
coefficients is based on HP-filtered time series.
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model predicts the only right signs of the correlation between output and the job
finding rates, but not at reasonable magnitudes. The same finding holds for the
relationship between output and job vacancies.
To sum up the obtained results we can state that within a rather standard real
business cycle framework, which is generally capable to replicate empirical facts,
unemployment and investment activities can be (in parts) explained by the existence
of rather generous welfare system as well as the availability of skilled workers.
4 Conclusion
In the recent paper we asked whether the East German unemployment problem is
only a problem of the labor market and labor market rigidities such as employment
protection mechanisms only. In parts, we can conclude in this way.
However, on the macroeconomic level (as well as shown in the data) too low
investments in productive activities are observed. Because of the strategic com-
plementarity between investments in technologies and skilled workers (which leave
Eastern Germany) firms reduce investments or do not invest in most of the East
German regions (only Dresden and Jena show significant lower unemployment rates
in comparison to the rest of Eastern Germany).
We found further supports of the results and suggestions by Phelps and Zoega
(2001), furthermore we have shown in a general equilibrium model that we can
replicate the empirical findings without assuming sclerotic labor markets. How-
ever, our results should further be a warning to politicians just to increase public
spending in Eastern Germany. Eastern Germany requires productive investments
by entrepreneurs and not from governments!
However, our results have to be justified by further empirical examinations of
the interplay between skills, investment and economic activity.
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